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children as heirs.' This view is positive in that adoption does not )ustify exclusion
in the absence of intent to limit heirs to blood relations.
Although the Kentucky Court -of Appeals, in the latest interpretation of the
word "heirs" has apparently adopted a liberal attitude, the decision falls squarely
within the scope of the general rule construing "heirs" in reference to an adopted
child taking under a will. The factual situation of Isaacs v. Manning would support the conclusion that a reasonable interpretation shows the existence of the
necessary intent to include the adopted child.
DEmPSEY Cox

IS A LESSOR OF MOTOR VEHICLES A CONTRACT CARRIER?
An increasing number of manufacturers and shippers who are located a
greater distance from their consumers than their competitors face the realization
that the soanng cost of transportation has materially weakened their competitive
position. Others find that new markets have opened up for their products in
places which are served by the existing carners only indirectly or not at all with
the result that the new markets are to them no markets at all. These and other
situations have resulted in a diligent search by the shipper for a cheaper, more
rapid, and more direct conveyance of his products.
One way in which shippers have avoided these difficulties has been the transportation of their goods by some motor earner under contract to haul goods according to the route, schedule, and rate which is most suitable for their specific type
of hauling. A route can thus be worked out which is more direct and a schedule
drawn in accordance with production plans. The effect of this is a quicker turnover with less need for a large amount of working capital. The one thing that
deters every shipper from accomplishing this seemingly Utopian result is the fact
that every interstate contract earner must obtain a permit from the Interstate
Commerce Commission before he will be allowed to operate over a new route or
haul a new type of goods.' The chances of the manufacturer being able to find
an operating contract earner with the authority to transport the particular goods
over the particular route wanted are comparatively nil. He must then find a
carrier willing to transport his goods according to his specifications. Once this is
done, the carrier must file an application to secure a permit allowing him to so
transport the goods. Due in part, no doubt, to the opposition of nearly every
common earner which operates over any part of the proposed route and the overcrowded condition of our highways, the Commission has become increasingly reluctant to issue any new permits.'
The shipper may avoid the necessity of complying with these Governmental
controls which are incident to obtaining permits for contract carriers and still retain most of the benefits which are concomitant with that type of shipping by using
his own trucks and men. This method of transportation brings with it, however,
the necessity of buying trucks and repair equipment which might be too great a
" Restatement, Property, sec. 305, comment Y (1940).
149 Stat. 552 (1935), 49 U.S.C. see. 309(a) (1946).
49 Stat. 552 (1935), 49 U.S.C. sec. 309(b) (1946).
' From October 31, 1948, to October 31, 1949, the Interstate Commerce
Commission 'withdrew 186 more permits than it granted. Sixty-Third Annual
Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission 104 (1949).
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burden for a smaller business. Even the larger businesses dislike the idea of
tying up their capital to go into the "trucking business" with which they are unfamiliar. Many feel that such an expenditure of capital could more profitably be
invested in the expansion of their own businesses.
It was long ago discovered that an arrangement by the shipper with a trucking company whereby the company would lease the trucks needed to the shipper
would incorporate nearly all the advantages found in both transportation by contract carrier and private carrier. Under such arrangement, the shipper could
transport his goods at the time and by the route best suited to his needs without
having to tie up his capital in a phase of business which he probably could not
operate as efficiently as the lessor, a person who devotes his full time to the business. The leasing of trucks has the added advantage of allowing the shipper
whenever he begins to ship a new type of goods to change the trucks then in use
to different ones more suitable to his needs without having to bear the loss which
comes with the buying and selling of motor vehicles.
However, the Interstate Commerce Commission will not accept without question every transaction which purports on its face to be a bona fide lease and hence
without its control. It quickly recognized that a lease of trucks at a stated amount
per mile or week or month may be no different than payment on a 100 pound
basis,' and that it might be nothing more than a subterfuge to circumvent the
necessity of applying for the permit required for contract earners.
The distinction between a bona fide lease and unauthorized operation on the
part of the alleged lessors has not been easy to make or to apply. The Commission has stated that, "One of the major difficulties with which we have been faced
in connection with regulation of common and contract earners subject to our
jurisdiction has been the practices of such carriers in the so-called leasing of
", The myriad [number of] variavehicles to shippers and private earners.
tions in which leases can be and are drawn has resulted in the Commission setting
up, in the case of H. B. Church Truck Service Co. Com. Car. Application,' a broad
test to determine whether the lease is effectual in creating the lessee a private
carrier; and, therefore, making the lessor not subject to the Commission s regulations. The test was "who has the right to control, direct, and dominate the performance of the service," and this is to be determined by the surrounding circumstances and actual practices. The right to direct denotes more than the right to
instruct where the motor vehicle is to go and the time at which a trip is to be
operated because such right is the natural attendant of any contract carmer operation under which specified vehicles are used exclusively by a single shipper.'
In the recent case of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Isner,' the court
formulated the test that the Motor Carrier. Act of 1935 is applicable to "all of
those who, not matter what form they used, are in substance engaged in the business of transportation of property on the public highways for hire."" Although
this case was brought to enjoin the lessor from continuing to transport goods from
ICarroll Contract Carrier Application, 1 M.C.C. 788 (1937).
'Sixty-Second Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission 101
(1948).
'27 M.C.C. 191 (1940).
Id. at 195.
'Centre Trucking Co. Inc., Common Carrier Application, 32 M.C.C. 313
(1942).
'92 F Supp. 582 (E. D. Mich. 1950).
'Id. at 587.
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Michigan to NeWvJersey without a permit, the court chose to rely principally on a
closely. analogous case which arose out of the three percent tax on charges of carriers for hire. The supporting case held that the decision of whether a lessor was
a motor carrier for hire and, hence, subject to the tax rested on the determination
of the following simple question. "Did the appellant [lessor] in fact furnish
substantially all the facilities for, and perform substantially all the functions of,
transporting the property of the forty-two customers [lessees] whose payments to
it were taxed?.... This court stated specifically, however, that it made no attempt
to tag the lessor a contract carner. In end result these tests are the same, for a
person who has the right to control, direct and dominate a business may fairly be
said to be in substance engaged in that business. In each of them, the courts look
beyond the lease to see the facts as they actually are in the light of surrounding
circumstances. The Act is a remedial statute and liberally interpreted to effect
its evident purpose.'
The one exception to this attitude of the courts is the case of Schenleu Distillers Corporation v. United States," wherein the lessor corporation, a wholly
owned subsidiary of the lessee, was held to be a contract earner despite the fact
that if the corporate veil were pierced the result would be that the lessee had the
right to control, direct and dominate the trucks and drivers even though they
were on the payroll of the lessor. The court based its decision on the fact that
corporate entities will not be disregarded where those in control have deliberately
adopted the corporate form to use advantages derived therefrom and where no
violence is done to legislative pumose by treating them as separate entities.
In determining whether the lease is bona fide, no one factor is conclusive, but
undoubtedly the most important of all the factors is whether the driver of the
truck is an employee of the slupper or the lessor. This was amply illustrated in
the case of John J. Casale, Inc., Contract Carrier Application," where the Commission held that the lessor was a contract carrier where he leased his trucks and
drivers together, and he was not so considered where he leased his trucks only,
although, the other factors surrounding the transactions were substantially similar.
Yet, this factor is of little importance when the lease is of the driver alone without
an accompanying truck, for in the Church case," the Commission held that a rebuttable presumption arose in favor of the lessor being a contract carner when the
lessor is a motor earner and leases equipment with drivers to the shipper. This
presumption will yield when the evidence shows that the shipper has the exclusive right and privilege of directing and controlling the transportation service.
Nevertheless, the case of Motor Haulage Co. Inc. v. United States" might well be
contended to stand for the rule that a lease of trucks and drivers by a motor carrier
to a private carrier raises a conclusive presumption that the lessor is operating as
a contract carrier. In that case, the lessor was held to be a contract carrier even
though he was without any responsibility if the cargo was lost or damaged. The
court in upholding the Commission s finding stated "That even when plaintiff
turned the driver and truck over to a lessee who then used the vehicle for its

" Bridge Auto Renting Corp. v. Pedrick, 174 F 2d 738 (C.C.A. 2d 1949).
See Georgia Truck System, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 1293
F 2d 210, 212 (C.C.A. 5th 1941).
326 U.S. 432 (1946).
" 44 M.C.C. 45 (1944).
"See note 6 supra.
"70 F Supp. 17 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
12
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own purposes prescribing routes, there still remained a presumption of control
by the plaintiff wich brought it within the category of a contract carrier under
the act."'
None of the surrounding factors which are usually found along with
the lease of driver and truck was present in this case. As already mentioned, the
lessor did not carry cargo insurance as liewas not responsible to the lessee for
any damage done to the cargo. Neither did he have a lease for-one trip only- a
situation which has been held invalid so consistently as to constitute it a positive
rule of law that such "trip-leases" of trucks and drivers are always deemed invalid
as creating the lessor a non-carrier. Further, he did not issue bills of lading to
the shipper as evidence of the cargo hauled, did not collect compensation on rates
computed on a 100 pound basis, nor did he assume liability for operation of the
leased vehicle on the lughway2' If the absence of every single factor which the
Commission usually relies on to support a finding that the lease is ineffectual is
not enough to rebut the presumption that a motor carrier is a contract carrier
when it leases both its trucks and drivers, it is dubious whether anything could
rebut such presumption, and no cases which have done so have been found.
Further evidence of this is the fact that the Commission pursuant to an investigation instituted on its own motion, Ex parte No. MC-43, Lease and Interchange of Motor Carriers," handed down an order, which was to be effective
September 18, 1950, but suspended indefinitely before that time,' that prohibited
the renting of equipment and drivers to non-carners, and the assisting of such
non-carners in the selection or obtainment of drivers for such equipment rented
to the non-earners. Both this suspended order and the presumption formulated
by Commission decisions apply only to "carers" who rent to non-carners; and,
therefore, they are inapplicable to a mere lessor of motor vehicles who does not
t
engage in any carnage of goods for hire in interstate commerce." However, a
lessor is deemed a motor earner if it has its-controlling interest owned by a earner
-z
in interstate commerce.
The necessity for making a bona fide lease is important to the lessor and the
lessee. The Commission has the power to enjoin the operations of any motor
earner under its jurisdiction which are earned on in a manner not authorized by
it.' It can also charge both the lessee and the lessor with criminal pumshment if
they knowingly and wilfully violate the Motor Carrier Act." In addition, there
is a three per cent tax levied on all charges of motor carriers for hire' and his
nonpayment of it will subject him to pecuniary penalties."
17Id. at 21.

"Interstate Commerce Commission v. F & F Truck Leasing Co., 78 F
Supp. 13 (Minn. 1948); John J. Casale Inc., Contract Carrier Application, 44
M.C.C. 45 (1944); Centre Trucking Co. Inc., Common Carrier Application, 32
M.C.C. 313 (1942); Columbia Terms. Co. Contract Career Application, 18
M.C.C. 662 (1939), 32 M.C.C. 177 (1942); Herbert Buesing Exemption Application, 32 M.C.C. 731 (1941); H. B. Church Truck Service Co. Comm. Car. Application, 27 M.C.C. 191 (1940); Forsyth Common Carrier Application, 16 M.C.C.
267 (1939); Carroll Contract Carrier Application, 1 M.C.C. 788 (1937).
" Mimeograph.
Suspended September 5, 1950.
"2See John J. Casale, Inc., Contract Carner Application, 44 M.C.C. 45,

52 (1944).
22Id. at 52, 53.
"49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. see. 322(b) (1946).
"'49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. sec. 322(a) (1946).
56 Stat. 979 (1942), 26 U.S.C. see. 3475 (1946).
" 49 Stat. 1027 (1935), 26 U.S.C. sec. 3612 (1946).
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If the draftsman will beep in mind the general principle and the relatively
few pitfalls which stand in the way of a lease being deemed bona fide, it will
enable him to draft the lease so that it will be upheld by the Commission and
the courts. If the lessor is a motor carrer, he must first look to see if there has
been an order pursuant to Ex Parte MC-48. The magnitude of the investigation,
which concerns itself mainly with interchanging and augmenting equipment between contract and common earners, necessarily delays any permanent order
being formulated; still, one will be forthcoming which might well contain further
prohibitions. The guiding principle in all these lease cases is to look through the
form of the lease to see whether the lessor is in substance engaged in transportation for hire, and this includes the situation where he has control, direction and
domination of the performance of the service. However, it has been deemed almost without exception that leases of vehicles and drivers together and "tripleases" constitute the lessors contract earners. Other factors which have frequently occurred in the cases and given weight in determining that the lessor was
a contract carrer are compensation computed on the amount of the cargo earned,
the lessor being responsible to the lessee for the safe delivery of the cargo and to
the public for any liability that may be incurred, and the vehicle having marks of
identification that indicate that it is owned and operated by the lessor. Still, if
these factors can be avoided and transportation by leased motor vehucles can be
arranged, it might well be the remedy so diligently sought by the shippers to
ameliorate the present transportation situation which has so burdened them
with worry.
JAMES M. MARS

THE MISDEMEANOR MANSLAUGHTER DOCTRINE UNDER
MODERN STATUTES*
There are many problems facing the prospective codifier of the law of homicide. Of these, one of the most interesting is the crime of involuntary manslaughter. The usual common law definition of this crime is similar to that used
by a United States District Court, "Involuntary Manslaughter is where death resulted unintentionally, so far as the defendant was concerned, from an unlawful
act on his part, not amounting to a felony, or from a lawful act negligently performed."' The same label and punishment are attached to a homicide committed
in the perpetration of a misdemeanor ("an unlawful act not amounting to a
felony"), and to a homicide resulting from the negligent commission of a lawful
act.
This note will be concerned only with the so-called misdemeanor manslaughter
phase of the crime of involuntary manslaughter as it now exists under statutes in
the United States. A brief discussion of the common law rules of the crime will
be in order to lay a foundation for the analysis of the statutes.
Hale stated that an unintentional homicide occurring in the course of any
misdemeanor was manslaughter. He, however, suggested a limitation on this
harsh rule by making a distinction between those misdemeanors malum in se and

* This is a companion note to the one by Mr. Cromley on page .........
'U.S. v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875, 880 (C.C. W.D. Tex., 1888).

